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							   March 11 2025

    Statement Regarding February 13 Sabotage and Subsequent Downtime

1. Summary

  On February 13 2025, rogue state employees organized the sabotage of
our installation, forcibly taking us offline for 24 days.  We began to
restore the installation on March 7.  As of March 11 nearly all services
should be operational.  If your service(s) are still inacessible, please
contact us.

2. No Data Breach

  No data have been breached and no storage devices have been copied.
Our systems also employ strong encryption, so that even if data are
copied, it would be very hard for the attackers to exploit them.  No
confidential information were copied or leaked.

3. Moving of the Installation

  Over the past months, the global situation in Ukraine has been
continuously deteriorating, because of the risks of forced drafting,
high-level staff could no longer work on site as effectively and the
supervision became insufficient.  Prior to the attack, work was underway
to begin moving the installation to a more secure location.  As a result
of the attack, the whole installation has been moved to the new
location.  Security at the new site superior by far and competent
personnel is present on site 24 hours a day.

4. Compensation

  We have added 25 days of free time to every service that was not
expired before February 13 as an immediate gesture.  We would like to
offer more time and will be working on this after assessment of our
financial situation.  Billing is currently suspended so that even
expired services will remain active for the time being.  We will restore
billing in a few days.

5. Resumption of support and sales

  Support has resumed, we are now working to answer all pending tickets.
Sales will resume in a few days.

6. On the Sabotage

  The attack was organized by rogue employees of the National Police of
Ukraine.  It is not currently determined if the individuals that
conducted the attack were direct employees of the police or if they had
been hired for that occasion.  We are working with our legal team to
track down the perpetrators.  While most of our partners have been very
supportive and provided their assistance, we now understand that one of
them is responsible for leaking confidential information that reinforced
the confidence of the saboteurs.

7. On the Motivation of the Attackers

  The motivation of the attackers is unclear, however we understand that
this may be a vengeful act as a result of our refusal to have informal
channels with them.  In Ukraine it is very common for employees of state
agencies to try to establish informal channels with directors of
companies so as to be able to bypass legal proceedings.  We have always
refused to have any informal channel with them and always required them
to follow legal proceedings; whenever they would fail to do so, our
legal department would submit them complaints; over the past months, and
because of the worsening of the situation in Ukraine, this seems to have
caused them greater distress.  Departments of the police such as the
cyberpolice are entirely illiterate and our legal department has been
responsible for sending them numerous complaints.  It is possible
therefore that they thought that shutting down our installation would be
better than confronting our legal department.

8. Internationalization

  We have planned before the attack to build new Points of Presence in
different countries.  While the attack has caused significant financial
damages, we are more determined to make this happen if our financial
situation will allow it.

9. Conclusion

  We would like to extend our apologies for the interruption of service
to all our users and customers and thank all those who have expressed or
provided their support, your support has been very important to us.
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